A Brief History of the Zapatista Movement

The Porfiriato

To understand the neo-zapatistas, one must not overlook the importance of Mexican history itself. Before we get to the eponymous Zapata, let us look towards the conditions that made the Mexican people turn to him in the first place.

The man who could be said to have the single greatest influence on the peasant revolt was Profirio Diaz. His importance to Mexican history immortalized as the years encompassing his six terms as president, 1876-1911, as The Porfiriato. Born to a Spanish father and mestizo mother, Diaz came into Mexico during its most tumultuous times. The era after Spanish rule was plagued with revolts, coups, and revolving door government systems. Despite Diaz’s lowborn status, he managed to attend school until he was sent to join the clergy through seminary by his religious parents. The Mexican nation, however, had no shortage of opportunity for the more military minded Diaz as he volunteered as a soldier in the Mexican-American War, participated in the overthrow of Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, fought the French during the Second French Intervention of the 1860s, and escaped captivity from the imperial forces backing Emperor Maximillian shortly after. This prestige earned him an appointment as the commander of the central army from his friend Mexican liberal icon, Benito Juarez. Soon after, Diaz challenged Juarez, stating that a 4th reelection was grounds for a dictatorship, running on a campaign slogan that was simply “No Reelection!” Juarez was immensely popular and won, but Diaz called this victory a fraud and announced his Plan de la Noria, calling all to assist him in ousting the liberal hero. Some in the military joined, but the rebellion was ultimately a failure. Juarez did not enjoy the victory for long as he died of a heart attack and was succeeded by Sebastian Lerdo de Tejada. Diaz’s slogan of “No Reelection!” was not quite as popular with a newfound president. So of course, he waited for Tejada’s reelection. Tejada was significantly less popular than Juarez, securing Diaz support from the military and religious conservatives. This time… it was also a failure with Tejada being elected once more. Diaz tried to overthrow the incumbent president, and his military force was able to secure a foothold in Mexico City. Tejada fled to the US while Diaz set up a provisional president to show how humble he was, then promptly defeated him in the next election. Now successful in becoming the president of Mexico, he amended the constitution to allow no reelections for presidents and quickly formed a circle of pragmatic technocrats for the insurmountable task of peace in Mexico. By stressing the importance of benefactors from the US, Diaz was able to legitimize his government and led to increased investment from their neighbors. At the end of the term, he stepped down and selected a successor, Manuel Gonzalez. Diaz then ran for reelection at the end of Gonzalez’s term, directly opposing his own amendment to presidential terms. Ironically, he amended twice more, allowing two terms, then unlimited terms. Thus starts the Porfiriato, characterized by favoritism towards the technocratic scientificos, foreign investors, and hacendados (landowners) over campesinos (tenant farmers).

Who Was Zapata

Eventually, the slogan of “no reelection” was reappropriated by a group of revolutionary liberals in the state of Morelos. The governor there had been considered a lapdog of Diaz and, by extension, the wealthy sugar cane plantation owners. Among the revolutionaries was Emiliano Zapata. Though his role here would be limited, it would be the start of his ever growing prestige among his home town of Anenecuilco and beyond. The political machine of Mexico was one that favored nepotism and backroom deals, and the resulting environment that came from that system meant that only the most savvy and connected men could hold office. Thus Diaz selected a new governor promising reform, placating most by having a fresh face take the position even if it was not their first choice. Zapata, however, was amongst those not at ease, especially since election day was a day when many of his comrades were arrested and held with little reason. This election for the governorship would be a precursor for the largest revolutionary action in Mexican history.

As Diaz pursued yet another term in 1910, a wealthy liberal by the name of Francisco I. Madero threw his hat into the presidential race and drew support from the peasantry of Mexico. He was unashamedly imprisoned by Diaz supporters in the police force during election day. Diaz was declared the winner soon after polls closed.

Madero’s defeat ended with him escaping to Texas and writing the Plan of San Luis Potosi, which called for armed revolution against the Diaz regime. At first, there was hardly a movement to be identified, but soon after Madero incorporated land reform into his platform that changed. Various leaders of rebel bands pledged themselves to Madero and soon Diaz had to put out fires in both the North and South of Mexico . Throughout this process, Zapata emerged as one of the most important figures of the revolution, both through military victories and luck. Being used often as a middleman and having recognizability, both the government and the rebels began to look to him as a symbol of the campesinos. Madero eventually succeeded in ousting Diaz and allowed an interim president to take over for a year. The next election Madero won with 90% of the vote. Soon, however, he would see how his promises meant something different to the peasantry.

His assurance that land titles would rightfully be returned through the court of law fell on deaf ears. Madero repeatedly called for the rebels to turn in their arms, the victory had already arrived! Zapata, however, was extremely distrustful of the new president and demanded swift reform. Madero had met with Zapata many times in order to negotiate a deal both could benefit from, but the belligerent general Victoriano Huerta harassed the revolutionaries with shows of power and artillery bombardments. Despite Madero trying to reel Huerta in, Zapata was convinced there could be no more negotiation. He drafted the Plan of Ayala and called for the removal of Madero.

The New Constitution

Madero already faced dissatisfaction with one of the most influential members of the rebellion, despite having massive public support across the country. Rebels were turned away by the peasantry as they did not see much benefit in continuing to hide the revolutionaries. Yet even then, rebel bands under the banners of Bernardo Reyes, Pascual Orozco, and Felix Diaz (nephew of Porfirio). The press, newly freed thanks to Madero himself, began to harshly criticize the president for his inability to provide stability across the country. Ironically, some of the generals he sent after the rebels were fans of scorched earth policy and the mass relocation of citizens, causing the rebel bands to bloat with new recruits filled with hate against the government. Madero began losing allies much faster than he could control, and eventually it culminated into a military coup led by Victoriano Huerta. Despite the harsh criticism against Madero, he WAS still an elected president. Huerta, in his pursuit of power, neglected this fact and was opposed by virtually all but the staunchest conservatives. Zapata found little trouble with recruiting rebels against the hated general and new bands began to form. One such band was the constitutionalists under Carranza. Through joint efforts, the bands were able to push Huerta into total retreat and Carranza, wealthy and connected, assumed power. He did not hide his dislike of the Zapatistas and left their political quite miniscule compared to his own inner circle. Zapata and Pancho Villa fought the Constitutionalists, but Zapata stayed in his home State when it was adequately controlled, leaving the front to rebuild his home. By 1917 Carranza drafted the new constitution, utilizing aspects of Zapata’s Plan De Ayala. This was no doubt an attempt to finally quell the rebellions that had plagued Mexico through the presidency of multiple men and claimed thousands of Mexican lives. This was not enough, and Carranza continued his campaign to eliminate Zapata, eventually succeeding in his assassination. Yet, land reform was codified in the constitution, and would be followed as the government gave out landholdings to the indigenous communities for decades to come.

NAFTA and Neozapatismo
The new constitution was written with the purpose of quelling the rebellion of the laborers and as such contains many concessions to their demands. The most pertinent article here is article 27. The first line reads “The property of all land and water within national territory is originally owned by the Nation, who has the right to transfer this ownership to particulars. Hence, private property is a privilege created by the Nation.” Here we see that private property is, in effect, always available for redistribution. There are restrictions placed stating that the reappropriation must be done with “clear public utility.” The state always had authority over natural resources, and had a responsibility to use it for social benefit and equal redistribution. Though private entities could also harness natural resources as long as they went through the state, nuclear energy was always a state run business. The way land was distributed was through “ejidos,” a concept of property that can be tied back to Aztec traditions. Communally held and legally protected even under Spanish rule, it was not a practice that was buried with time. The provision also cancelled many, with few exceptions, so-called unjust sales of land within the last 10 years and over 50 hectares. It is worth noting that before his death Zapata had already begun applying his revolutionary Plan De Ayala in his home state of Morelos, some of which continue to this day. It is generally accepted that the land redistribution that took place on the federal level was below what Zapata would have expected, but just enough to shake off rebels. Mexican presidents would be judged by their efforts to make article 27 come to its end goal, or their efforts to impede it. In 1934, president Lazaro Cardenas increased the amount of land redistributed and gave the legal protections of those holdings a framework which resembled the Aztec practice of communal holdings. This marked the departure from the common concept of property that prevailed mexican politics at the time. This can be seen as a victory for “mexicanization” as the frameworks brought by colonists were being cast aside in favor of a more indigenous system. After president Cardenas, land reform was slowed. President Miguel Aleman allowed entrepreneurs to rent land to the peasantry. President Echeverria redistributed a large amount of private land, but his overall dictatorial populist rhetoric suggests this may have been opportunism as he had once expressed discontent with land reform. This is not to say that before these presidents that land reform had gone in the manner the peasantry wanted. Private creditors could not use the ejido land as collateral, increasing dependence on government loans. Oftentimes ejido “owners” would lack documentation, whether by design or incompetence is debatable, to prove that the land was theirs. This created worry, as the Mexican Revolution was rife with stories of disputes that always favor the landowner with the larger holding. In addition, the labor needed for the land was not workable by the “owners” alone and renting, an illegal act, was seen as a temporary solution. These factors combined to make it so that politicians could strong-arm votes from local ejido holders, seeing as the government technically owned all land. A dependency had been created, and ejidos began to fall below what was needed in the country. Imports of food increased, and ejidos were considered failures. Debates both for and against privatization began to rise, opponents pointing to the fact that ejidos had been located on poor land and exposed the peasantry to corruption both from within the ejidos and without. Proposed solutions ranged from the creation of an association ranging from private citizens to businesses that would assist in renting ejido land, to increased autonomy, to full privatization. The election of Carlos Selina de Gortari in 1988 sealed the fate of the ejidos.

President Carlos Selina de Gortari was the president when NAFTA was drafted, and his decision to jump into such an agreement has colored the Mexican population’s opinion of him to this day. On top of NAFTA, Selina had already made changes to article 27. The changes can be categorized in 2 sections. Firstly, he deleted sections promising the redistribution of land. Second, he allowed the land to be rented or sold. It is not difficult to see why the first set of changes were disliked, but how could increased independence have been viewed unfavorably? Simply because the ejido had become a form of communal identity, transferring titles from one owner to another would not be an issue if they are in the same community. However, Mexico’s government is paternalistic, and the thought that a multinational corporation could trick an ejido holder into renting or even selling their land was reviled immediately. Not to mention ideas like common defense were pervading since the presidency of Cardenas, which was also tied to closely-knit communities. This revised system called back to the powerful sugar cane owners of the state of Morelos, which was exactly the issue that allowed the Zapatistas to grow as large as they did. The signing of NAFTA was the match that lit the powder keg of Mexico once more. The invitation of multinational corporations to import their products deemed as “fake” and to claim vast swathes of land to rent out to workers was irredeemable to the Zapatistas whose core tenant is anti globalism. On January 1, 1994, 3,000 armed insurgents seized multiple towns and cities in the state of Chiapas. Armed clashes continued until a ceasefire on the 12th. The Neozapatistas had support within the catholic church, as liberation theology was a shared idea among some members of both groups. Though the Mexican government tried an offensive in 1995, it was wildly unpopular and diplomacy was favored. Here Subcomandate Marcos, seen by many as the face, albeit concealed by a mask, of the movement revealed his pacifistic inclinations and reacted favorably to peace talks. President Vicente Fox, upon being elected in 2001, tried to negotiate once more with the Neozapatistas but talks fell through and the insurgents created various autonomous territories in the state of Chiapas. The influence of the Neozapatistas remained consistently high for a decade, celebrating such a long period of autonomy.

The EZLN (Zapatista Army of National Liberation) began with a military assault in order to establish its territory, but it has been described as a peaceful movement since then. They carry weapons in order to defend themselves, calling back to the common defense of ejidos. Terrorist attacks by leftist movements have happened in Mexico, though many that occurred during the Neozapatistas rise were committed by the Popular Revolutionary Army. The governmental structure of the Neozapatistas is democratic in nature, and though this can lend itself to mob rule, members of the autonomous zones are given the freedom to leave. Political offices are rotated with terms being fairly short, as short as 2 weeks, creating a system that emphasizes community loyalty over individual power grabs. In addition, those in the EZLN do not actually hold more power than others in the regions, their “ranks” being more akin to pseudonyms than hierarchical power. The economy is largely communal, private property is non existent within the autonomous zones, however the regions do export to other nations (mostly Mexico) and use the money made to fund public goods such as healthcare, education, loans, or radio stations. Education is particularly democratic, drawing upon a system composed of community input and low or non-existent importance on grading. This system is similar to anarchist ideas during the free thought movement in the United States, though writings on the topic are present wherever anarchists could be found. Their attitude towards electoralism was cold for quite a while, but in 2017 they endorsed Maria de Jesus Patricio Martinez as a candidate. She did not appear on the ballot due to lack of signatures. The current president, AMLO, was once a vocal critic of the Neozapatistas, but when they announced intent to claim more land he stated it was fine so long as violence was not involved. In social issues, the Neozapatistas reportedly have lower instances of domestic violence and promote gender equality while decrying violence against women or LGBTQ minorities.


What We Can Learn From This Movement

Many of the Neozapatistas beliefs and practices, from a right libertarian perspective, seem to be contrary to the basic tenets of liberty and individuality. It is important to remember that in the indigenous culture, of which they draw inspiration for their structures (such as the concepts of “ichbail ta muk” which implies a collective heart), this is a matter of course. We have no goal to romanticize these pieces of their organization as indigenism against the neocolonialist view that pervades the Latin American region. Even within their own sphere of influence, such as in Polho, dissatisfaction grows with the Neozapatista mode of organization as populations move in and out of the regions. Decisions are ignored in order to keep land that displaced individuals believe are rightly theirs. The region itself was dependent on international aid, such as from the International Committee of the Red Cross, for a while. The unique relationship this develops, between local population to rebel to NGO, meant that leaders had to become skilled managers. This in turn creates a system where not all representatives can be equally capable, depending on a region’s needs. However, the quick rotation of such representatives meant more people were trained to handle such an environment, the skills learned here having a multitude of benefits as the communities had more “experts” being trained. These experts were always available to the people and took great pride in being more efficient than the usual bureaucratic systems they are trying to replace. Beyond this, it is difficult to say much more about the dealings within Neozapatista politics due to the fact that they are secretive about their systems to outsiders.

Though their ideas of mutual aid had a rocky implementation, data from as recent as 2014 shows the autonomous regions have greater access to healthcare than comparative non zapatista regions. Though it is universal, medication is sold so that restocking fees can be covered. As mentioned earlier, education in the autonomous region takes form in a way similar to anarchist ideas on education. This coupled with political training makes it so more people have access to education within the region than outside of it.

These are successes with autonomy no doubt, but is it enough to point to a region and say “see? It worked here, we got what we needed.” I believe the greatest influence of this movement is its ability to appeal to groups internationally. It can be seen as a Marxist movement, though Subcomandate Marcos refuses to label it as such. They prefer to leave it open so as to be utilized by movements across the world, free to be added to by cultures rather than a rigid set of rules of governance. Though it is an anticapitalist movement, they have received criticism from communism over their usage of wage labor and their lack of interest in abolishing money. It is worth mentioning that NAFTA has not delivered what was promised to Mexico, with its growth slowing below most Latin American countries and being explicitly tied to the US economy, fears expressed by the Neozapatistas decades before. Beyond their vast political appeal due to their flexibility of theory, the implementation of liberation theology also allows them to invite the support of Christians. Beyond this, a growing population in the autonomous region are becoming Muslim, showcasing religious tolerance. The implementation of indigenous culture while holding progressive values towards women and the LGBT also place the movement in a favorable position when seen by the international community. In fact their greatest success beyond establishing the regions themselves, is winning support from the world by making themselves appear more competently aware of social problems than the federal government of Mexico. Libertarians should not compromise their positions in order to gain larger mass appeal. The Neozapatistas did not compromise any of their beliefs, rather they simply reached them from various starting points allowing them to appeal to Catholics, socialists, anarchists, autonomists, agrarianist, and more. This flexibility without compromise has the potential to be a powerful tool, as various leftist groups still look to the Zapatista rebellion for inspiration. Right libertarians would do well to analyze what ideas beyond economic function inspire such a lasting impression on people. After all, it was not so long ago that the spirit of revolution was tied to classical liberalism, but if you tell this to a modern leftist they would simply disbelieve it. They have claimed the aesthetic of revolution, often romanticizing even the violence of it, and it is important to analyze why this appeal is so universal.

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